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Abstract
This paper presents a sufficient condition for the quasi−acyclic condition. A game is
quasi−acyclic if from any strategy profile, there exists a finite sequence of strict best replies
that ends in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The best−reply dynamics must converge to a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium in any quasi−acyclic game. A game has the pure Nash
equilibrium property (PNEP) if there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in any game
constructed by restricting the set of strategies to a subset of the set of strategies in the original
game. Any finite, ordinal potential game and any finite, supermodular game have the PNEP.
We show that any finite, two−player game with the PNEP is quasi−acyclic.
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Consider the following best-reply dynamics: at each period, only one player
gets the opportunity to revise his strategy. The probability of getting the
revision opportunity is equal among all players. If the strategy of a player
with the revision opportunity is one of his best replies to the current strategy
proﬁle, then he continues to take the current strategy. Otherwise, he switches
to any of his best replies to the current strategy proﬁle with equal probability.
Friedman and Mezzetti (2001) introduce the concept of quasi-acyclic
games. A game is quasi-acyclic if from any strategy proﬁle, there exists
a ﬁnite sequence of strict best replies that ends in a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium. The best-reply dynamics must converge to a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in any quasi-acyclic game. In this paper, we present a suﬃcient
condition for the quasi-acyclic condition.
Friedman and Mezzetti (2001) also introduce the concept of the weak
ﬁnite improvement property (week FIP) and show that the better-reply dy-
namics must converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in any game with
the weak FIP. The class of games with the weak FIP includes the classes
of quasi-acyclic games, ﬁnite, supermodular games, and generic, continuous,
two-player, quasi-concave games. The class of quasi-acyclic games includes
the class of games with the ﬁnite improvement property (FIP) deﬁned in
Monderer and Shapley (1996), which, in turn, includes the classes of ﬁnite,
dominance solvable games, and ﬁnite, ordinal potential games.
2. Notation and Deﬁnitions
Let g =  N,A,π  be a game, where N is the set of players, Ai is the ﬁnite
set of all strategies of player i, A =

i∈N Ai is the set of all strategy proﬁles,
πi is player i’s payoﬀ function over A, and π =( πi)i∈N. For any strategy
proﬁle a =( ai)i∈N, a−i =( aj)j =i denotes a strategy proﬁle of all players
other than player i. For any nonempty subset Bi of Ai for each player i and
B =

i∈N Bi, let g|B =  N,B,π|B  be a subgame of g, where π|B is the
restriction of π on B.1
Player i’s strategy a 
i is said to be one of player i’s strict best replies to
a if a 
i is one of player i’s best replies to a−i and πi(a 
i,a −i) >π i(a).2 a  is
said to be a (single-player) strict best reply to a if there exists a player i such
that a 
−i = a−i and a 
i is one of player i’s strict best replies to a. A strategy
1This paper uses the term “subgame” in the sense of Shapley (1964). This usage is
diﬀerent from the usual interpretation in extensive form games.
2Some authors use the term “player i’s strict best reply” for player i’s unique best
reply. Note that their usage is diﬀerent from ours.
1proﬁle a∗ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if there is no strict
best reply to a∗. A game g is quasi-acyclic if, for any strategy proﬁle a, there
exists a ﬁnite sequence of strict best replies that starts in a and ends in a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium of g.
A strategy proﬁle a  is said to be a single-player improvement over a if
there exists a player i such that a 
−i = a−i and πi(a ) >π i(a). A game g has
the weak FIP if, for any strategy proﬁle a ∈ A, there exists a ﬁnite sequence
of single-player improvements that starts in a and ends in a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of g. Any quasi-acyclic game has the weak FIP.
Deﬁnition 1 A game g =  N,A,π  has the pure Nash equilibrium property
(PNEP)i fg|B has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for any product subset
B of A.
Any ﬁnite, ordinal potential game has the PNEP since it has a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium and its subgame is also a ﬁnite, ordinal potential
game. Any ﬁnite, supermodular game has the PNEP since it has a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium and its subgame is also a ﬁnite, supermodular
game.3 Shapley (1964) shows that any ﬁnite, two-player, zero-sum game has
the PNEP if and only if any of its 2 × 2 subgames has a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
3. Results
Proposition 1 Any ﬁnite, two-player game with the PNEP is quasi-acyclic.
Proof. Let g =  {1,2},A,π  be a ﬁnite, two-player game with the PNEP.
We will prove this by mathematical induction on the cardinality of A.
If A is a singleton {a}, then a is a sequence that ends in a Nash equilib-
rium.
For any k  2, suppose that Lemma 2 holds for |A| <k . Consider a game
with |A| = k. Without loss of generality, |A1|  2. Also, since g has the
PNEP, g has a Nash equilibrium a∗. Let B1 := A1 \{a∗
1} and B := B1 ×A2.
We have |B| <k . Since g has the PNEP, g|B also has the PNEP. Hence, by
the induction hypothesis, g|B has a sequence of strict best replies from any
strategy proﬁle that ends in a Nash equilibrium.
3As in Friedman and Mezzetti (2001), when we consider a supermodular game, we
assume that Ai is a totally ordered set. If g is a supermodular game where Ai is a lattice,
then its subgame g|B is not necessarily a supermodular game unless Bi is a sublattice of
Ai.
2Given any strategy proﬁle a0 ∈ A, we will construct a sequence of strict
best replies in g from a0 that ends in a Nash equilibrium.
Case 1. Suppose that a0 ∈ B. Then g|B has a sequence (a0,a 1,...,a t)
of strict best replies, where at is a Nash equilibrium of g|B. It suﬃces to
consider the case where the sequence is not a sequence of strict best replies
in the original game g that ends in a Nash equilibrium of g. Then there
exists t∗ such that (i) 0  t∗  t, (ii) for any s such that 0  s<t ∗, there
exists player i such that i has a strict best reply to as, a
s+1
i is one of player




1 is one of player 1’s
strict best replies to at∗
in g.
Let b0 =( a∗
1,a t∗
2 ). It follows from Conditions (ii) and (iii) that if b0
is a Nash equilibrium of g, then (a0,a 1,...,a t∗
,b 0) is a sequence of strict
best replies in g that ends in a Nash equilibrium of g and if b0 is not a
Nash equilibrium of g, then (a0,a 1,...,a t∗
,b 0,a ∗) is a sequence of strict best
replies in g that ends in a Nash equilibrium of g.
Case 2. Suppose that a0 / ∈ B.I f a0 is a Nash equilibrium, then a0
is a sequence that ends in a Nash equilibrium of g.I f a0 is not a Nash
equilibrium, then (a0,a ∗) is a sequence of strict best replies in g that ends in
a Nash equilibrium of g.
Friedman and Mezzetti (2001) claim in Lemma 2 that any ﬁnite, two-
player, supermodular game has the weak FIP. In that paper, they extend this
result to any ﬁnite, more-than-two-player, supermodular game. Proposition
1 in this paper is another extension of this result, but in a diﬀerent direction.
Note that a ﬁnite, two-player game with the PNEP is not necessarily quasi-
supermodular.4 Consider the game g =  {1,2},A,π , where A = {t,m,b}×
{l,c,r} and π is given by
lcr
t 1,1 2,2 0,0
m 2,2 0,0 2,1
b 0,0 1,2 1,1
.
By easy but tedious calculation, we can see that g has the PNEP but is not
quasi-supermodular under any pair of orders on {t,m,b} and {l,c,r}.5
4A game g =  N,A,π  is said to be a quasi-supermodular game if for any player i, Ai









 ) ⇒ πi(a) >π i(a
 
i,a −i)
for any strategy proﬁles a and a  such that aj  a 
j for any player j. Any supermodular
game is a quasi-supermodular game but the converse is not true.
5To see that g is not quasi-supermodular in any pair of orders, suppose that g is
3Any quasi-acyclic game has the weak FIP, but the converse is not true.
Friedman and Mezzetti (2001) give an example of a two-player game that has
the weak FIP, but is not quasi-acyclic. In Proposition 2, however, we can see
that the weak FIP of all subgames is equivalent to the quasi-acyclicity of all
subgames.
Proposition 2 Let g be a ﬁnite, two-player game. Then the following are
equivalent:
(i) g has the PNEP;
(ii) g|B is quasi-acyclic for any product subset B of A;
(iii) g|B has the weak FIP for any product subset B of A.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii): Take any product subset B of A. Since g has the PNEP,
g|B also has the PNEP. By Proposition 1, g|B is quasi-acyclic.
(ii) ⇒ (iii) and (iii) ⇒ (i) are immediate because any quasi-acyclic game
has the weak FIP and any game with the weak FIP has a pure Nash equi-
librium.
4. A Counterexample
A ﬁnite, more-than-two-player game with the PNEP is not necessarily quasi-
acyclic. Consider the game g =  {1,2,3},A,π , where A = {t,m,b}×
{l,c,r}×{ x,y,z} and π is given by
lcr
t 0,0,0 2,2,1 2,1,2
m 2,1,2 0,0,1 1,2,2













g has the PNEP but is not quasi-acyclic because the only sequence of strict
best replies from (b,l,x) is cyclic as follows:
(b,l,x) → (m,l,x) → (m,r,x) → (t,r,x) → (t,c,x)
→ (t,c,z) → (t,l,z) → (t,l,y) → (b,l,y) → (b,l,x) →···.
quasi-supermodular under some pair of orders. Without loss of generality, we assume
t<m . Then we have c<rbecause player 1’s payoﬀ function π1 is quasi-supermodular
on {t,m}×{c,r}. Similarly, by the quasi-supermodularity of π1, c<rimplies t<b<m .
Moreover, t<bimplies l<rby the quasi-supermodularity of π1, but the orders of b<m
and l<rcontradict the quasi-supermodularity of π2 on {m,b}×{ l,r}.
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